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The effect of horizontal pay dispersion on the effectiveness of performance-based incentives 
 
  
Abstract: In response to general calls for increased transparency in society, pay transparency 
policies are growing in importance. Given that pay transparency unavoidably gives employees the 
opportunity to make comparisons between themselves and others, in this study we address the 
question of how these comparisons impact the incentive effects of performance contingent pay, 
and consequently their performance outcomes. Specifically, we empirically examine whether 
horizontal pay dispersion alters the effectiveness of performance-based pay contracts, which firms 
typically use to incentivize effort. Exploiting our unique access to a large healthcare provider, we 
document the moderating role of horizontal pay dispersion on the effectiveness of individual 
monetary incentives at generating increased individual performance. To provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the moderating effect of pay dispersion, we further examine the boundary 
conditions of the proposed interaction. In particular, we examine the differential effect of overall 
pay dispersion on employees that rank high versus low in the pay distribution and disaggregate 
overall pay dispersion into performance-related versus performance-unrelated pay dispersion. Our 
findings consistently show a positive moderating effect of pay dispersion when employees are 
more likely to consider the observed pay dispersion as legitimate, and a negative moderation effect 
when this is less likely the case. Our study strengthens the understanding of how individual level 
incentives function in the context of a multi-person firm setting. Our results document that 
individual incentives are effective, but also suggest that pay dispersion can have a significant 
influence on the incentive-performance relation. These findings provide some evidence that 
individuals are concerned not only with their own payout, but also with that of others, and that this 
concern has a significant impact on individual’s effort provision, and consequently performance. 
 
Keywords: Incentive compensation, pay-for-performance sensitivity, social comparisons, pay 
dispersion, pay transparency 
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1. Introduction 
In response to general calls for increased transparency in society, pay transparency policies 
are growing in importance (e.g., Alexandre Mas, 2017). While nowadays many firms adopt 
policies to disclose pay information to their workforce (e.g., Qualtrics, Buffer, Atlassian, and 
Whole Foods), other firms restrict such information flows, and some even adopt rules to prevent 
their employees from sharing pay information with each other (Feichter, Grabner, & Moers, 2018). 
Although research has documented positive performance effects of pay transparency (e.g., Greiner, 
Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011), probably the most critical reason organizations do not actively 
disclose pay information is to discourage workers from making comparisons with their peers based 
on differences in observable pay. The fear is that through such comparisons, individuals will 
evaluate their current situation, and negative comparisons will result in potentially undesirable 
behavior (Day, 2007). One undesirable consequence is that employees might reduce their effort 
provision, and thus performance. Given that pay transparency unavoidably gives employees the 
opportunity to observe others’ pay, in this study we investigate a specific comparison likely to 
arise from pay transparency, horizontal pay dispersion (HPD).1 Horizontal pay dispersion is the 
spread of pay within the same hierarchical level of the firm (Bloom, 1999). 2 Specifically, we 
empirically examine whether horizontal pay dispersion alters the effectiveness of performance-
based pay contracts, which firms typically use to incentivize effort.  
                                                 
1 The goal of our study is not to study a change in pay transparency per se, but instead to examine a potential 
consequence of the sharing of pay information likely arising from pay transparency policies. In fact, in our setting 
the firm discourages sharing pay information but survey data suggests the majority of employees (>98%) have 
knowledge of the pay of others within the firm. 
2 This is distinctly different from vertical pay dispersion, dispersion in pay among employees of different levels of 
the firm. While recent studies examine the effects of vertical pay dispersion on firm performance (e.g., Park & Kim, 
2017; Rouen, 2019), we examine how horizontal pay dispersion impacts individual performance. This is an 
important distinction as horizontal pay dispersion allows for more direct comparison of performance and pay as 
employees are in the same level of the firm performing the same job. This allows for a cleaner integration of social 
comparison and incentives by holding constant the task each employee is performing.  
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While agency theory predicts broad effectiveness of individual pay for performance, 
Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) posit that this well-established incentive-performance relation might 
be moderated by factors related to the person, task, environment, or incentive scheme itself. One 
potential moderating variable, often overlooked in prior accounting research, is the impact of social 
comparisons. We argue that these social comparisons, an individual’s relative evaluation of 
performance and pay across relevant peers, provide an additional information set useful in making 
effort provision decisions that is complementary to the information set suggested by agency theory 
(Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012). To the extent individuals incorporate information on the pay and 
performance of relevant peers in their effort provision decision, we expect the motivational effect 
of individual incentives to vary in the presence of pay dispersion information. Consistent with the 
theoretical predictions in Larkin et al. (2012), we predict and find a significant moderating effect 
of horizontal pay dispersion on the effectiveness of performance-based pay. Further, we note this 
effect is altered contingent upon the perceived legitimacy of the dispersion in pay. 
Our research site is a publicly traded national healthcare provider employing approximately 
8,000 employees, of which 1,800 are service providers (all performing highly comparable jobs at 
the same hierarchical level), in around 450 clinics across the country. Our sample consists of 
service providers performing the same job (i.e., no specialists) with the same level of training and 
nested within clinics across the firm. To address our research question, we exploit (1) the 
consequences of the firm’s acquisition strategy resulting in differences in the parameters of the 
incentive contracts for the same job across service providers (e.g., different commission rates) and 
thus variation in both pay-for-performance sensitivity across individuals as well as dispersion in 
total payout across clinics, and (2) the firm’s use of a “draw-against-commission” incentive 
scheme resulting in variation in pay-for-performance sensitivity within individuals over time. 
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Using panel data spanning 44 months, we first examine whether the overall level of pay dispersion 
in a given clinic month moderates the relation between the intensity of performance-based pay and 
individual performance (H1). Relying on multiple empirical specifications, as well as alternative 
measures of both incentive intensity and pay dispersion, we provide evidence that both incentive 
intensity and overall pay dispersion are positively related to future performance, consistent with 
prior research. Importantly, and unique to our study, we also document a significant and 
economically large interaction between these two variables. Across multiple metrics and differing 
time intervals, our results consistently show that the motivational effect of individual incentives is 
strengthened in the presence of overall pay dispersion.  
To provide a more nuanced understanding of the moderating effect of pay dispersion, we 
go on to examine the boundary conditions of the proposed interaction. In particular, prior research 
suggests that the effect of pay dispersion depends on the degree to which employees perceive the 
pay dispersion to be legitimate (Bloom, 1999). While pay dispersion by definition describes pay 
inequality, the extent to which it also creates perceptions of pay inequity is context-specific 
(Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012). Thus, we identify conditions under which pay dispersion is 
more likely perceived as being legitimate. Prior research suggests that employees’ perceptions of 
organizational justice, both distributive and procedural, play an important role in their response to 
the variability in outcomes generated in performance-based incentive systems. We thus investigate 
the potential for the observed distribution in payouts to impact the effort provision response (H2), 
followed by an examination of perceived fairness in the payout distribution procedure on effort 
provision (H3). 
Regarding the first, we argue that the employee’s position in the pay distribution will alter 
his reaction to pay dispersion, and investigate whether the proposed interaction effects differ across 
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high and low earners in the firm. In particular, we expect that employees who rank relatively high 
(low) in the pay distribution within their clinic are more (less) likely to perceive the pay dispersion 
as legitimate and thus their effort choice will be more (less) sensitive to incentive intensity when 
confronted with increasing pay dispersion. Our results continue to document positive main effects 
of incentive intensity in both subsets. However, while in the “high earner” subsample we continue 
to document both a positive main effect of pay dispersion as well as a positive interaction between 
dispersion and intensity, in the “low earner” subsample we find evidence of a negative relation 
between overall dispersion and performance, as well as a significant negative interaction term, at 
least for one of our measures of incentive intensity. This suggests that for the group of low earners 
the motivational effect of individual incentives may be completely swamped by the negative 
impact of pay dispersion. 
Regarding the latter, we argue that the perceptions of fairness in the allocation procedure 
are likely formed by assessing how the variation in the resource allocation mirrors the variation in 
the observable productivity. Following this reasoning, recent research on horizontal pay dispersion 
has disaggregated horizontal pay dispersion based on the source of the dispersion, that is,  
performance-related versus performance-unrelated dispersion (Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012; 
Shaw & Gupta, 2007; Trevor et al., 2012). We adopt this distinction and argue that the information 
gathered from social comparisons in the presence of performance-related and performance-
unrelated dispersion differentially affects the effectiveness of performance-based pay at 
motivating performance. In particular, we expect that pay dispersion generated from performance 
is more likely perceived as legitimate. Thus, observing performance-related dispersion will 
highlight the instrumentality between pay and performance, thereby strengthening the effect of 
individual incentives.  Our results are consistent with this expectation and consistently show a 
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positive relation between performance and dispersion related to performance as well as a 
significant and positive interaction effect between individual incentives and dispersion related to 
performance. Performance-unrelated dispersion, on the other hand, is less likely considered 
legitimate. Thus, observing performance-unrelated dispersion will dampen the perceived relation 
between performance and pay and thereby inhibit the effectiveness of individual incentives. 
Consistent with this prediction, we document a negative main effect of performance-unrelated 
dispersion, as well as a negative and significant interaction effect, suggesting that the effect of 
individual incentives is weakened in the presence of performance-unrelated dispersion. Overall, 
our findings confirm that pay inequality does not create motivational problems per se, but will be 
considered inequitable, and thus unfair, to the extent the employee falls in the lower half of the 
distribution (Bloom, 1999; Trevor & Wazeter, 2006) and/or to the extent that it cannot be explained 
by observable performance-related factors (Trevor et al., 2012). 
Our study contributes to the literatures on individual incentives and pay dispersion in 
several related ways. To our knowledge, we are the first to empirically examine the effects of 
horizontal pay dispersion on individual incentive effectiveness to infer whether individuals are 
concerned with the payouts of their peers in addition to their own monetary compensation. In 
showing this, our study emphasizes that understanding social comparisons is vital to the success 
of performance-based compensation systems, suggesting additional costs and benefits of 
implementing individual incentives not examined under traditional agency theory models. 
Relatedly, the unmeasured costs of these social comparisons may be at least partly responsible for 
the mixed evidence on the effectiveness of individual incentives found in the academic literature 
(Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle, & Young, 2000; Jutras, 2007). Further, we confirm and extend prior 
research on pay dispersion that finds pay dispersion affects individual performance outcomes 
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differently to the extent that such dispersion is likely to be perceived as legitimate (Bloom, 1999; 
Trevor et al., 2012; Trevor & Wazeter, 2006). We find evidence that legitimate dispersion 
strengthens the relation between incentive intensity and individual performance, while dispersion 
that is more likely to be perceived as unfair weakens it.  
Empirical evidence on the interaction of incentives and horizontal pay dispersion is scarce 
due to data availability limitations. Access to our research site provides us with a unique 
opportunity to study pay dispersion and individual incentive effectiveness of lower-level 
employees. In our setting, we observe variation in pay dispersion, incentive intensity, and 
performance while keeping job functions and work characteristics constant, which is a prerequisite 
for meaningful social comparisons.  
Our study additionally contributes to the debate on the costs and benefits of pay 
transparency policies, highlighting the role this information plays and its consequences to the firm. 
We document that even in a system without a formal transparency policy some pay information is 
likely to be shared among employees. From a practitioner point of view, our findings suggest that 
the sharing of information that occurs even without a transparency mandate may have negative 
motivational consequences, which in turn might imply that a formal transparency policy allowing 
employees to more fully justify differences in pay may be superior. Whether this is indeed the case 
remains an interesting avenue for future research. Relatedly, our evidence underscores the 
importance of complementary disclosures to facilitate the perceived legitimacy of observed pay 
dispersion among peers.  
2. Prior literature and hypothesis development 
2.1 The integration of agency, expectancy and social comparison theories 
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Although economic theory outlines the fundamental role incentives play in motivating 
costly effort, empirical tests of the relation between monetary incentives and performance provide 
mixed results, especially as it relates to lower-level employees. Several accounting and economics 
studies have shown support for the effectiveness of performance-based incentives (e.g., Banker, 
Lee, & Potter, 1996; Lazear, 2000; A. Mas, 2006; Tuttle & Burton, 1999). However, other studies 
question the incentive-performance relation (e.g., Bouwens & van Lent, 2006; Fessler, 2003; 
Hannan, 2005). Bonner et al. (2000) provide a meta-analysis of 131 laboratory studies using 
incentives and performance,3 and report that a significant positive relation between incentives and 
performance is found in less than half of the included studies. Guzzo, Jette, and Katzell (1985) 
provide a similar analysis of field-based studies and conclude that on average there is no effect of 
financial incentives on performance. In a 2004 survey of 350 firms, J.  Pfeffer and Sutton (2006) 
found that 83% of organizations believe that their pay-for-performance systems are either “not-at-
all” or only “somewhat” effective. 
Academic research suggests one reason underlying these results could be that our 
understanding of the functioning of monetary incentives for lower-level employees may be 
incomplete (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Larkin et al., 2012). Nyberg, Pieper, and Trevor (2013) 
note that understanding the complex relation between pay and performance “has been constrained 
by narrow approaches to pay-for-performance conceptualization, measurement, and surrounding 
conditions” (p. 1) in the academic literature thereby providing little insight into the motivational 
effects of the pay-for-performance system. Further, Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) suggest that the 
incentive performance relation may be moderated by variables related to the person, task, 
environment, or incentive scheme itself. Consistent with this intuition, the model proposed in 
                                                 
3 See also Jenkins (1986) and Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, and Shaw (1998) for a review of incentive studies outside of the accounting 
literature. 
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Larkin et al. (2012) suggests that our understanding of individual incentives is limited when the 
psychological costs of social comparisons are not included. Overall, these studies suggest that 
current academic work conceptualizing a simple pay-performance relation may be incomplete.  
 The traditional intuition for the incentive effect of performance-based pay suggests that in 
making the effort allocation decision individuals rely on information about their own effort, 
performance, and outcomes. Agency theory argues that under performance-based pay systems 
individuals are incentivized to trade-off leisure time for increased wealth thereby motivating 
individuals to exert more effort in the measured direction (Baiman, 1982, 1990). Expectancy 
theory provides similar intuition through slightly modified channels. In its most basic form this 
theory argues that individual behavior is motivated by the expectancy of a relation between effort 
and the related outcome and by the valence of that outcome (Vroom, 1964). Individual incentives 
increase the instrumentality (i.e., they clarify the relation between performance and reward) and 
provide increased valence of the outcome in the form of additional compensation, thereby 
inducing increased effort.  
Research in organizational behavior suggests that in order to create differences in 
behavior under either agency or expectancy theory, individual incentives systems must create 
perceptible differences in pay for differential performance (Gupta & Jenkins, 1996; Mitra, 
Gupta, & Jenkins, 1997; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2002). Without differences in performance 
resulting in observable differences in pay, the channel by which performance and reward are 
related is ill-defined resulting in a lack of motivation on the part of the employee. While neither 
agency nor expectancy theories directly comment on the channels by which individuals gather 
information on the relation between performance and reward, because both theories are 
individual in nature, it is believed that the individual gathers this information through repeated 
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interactions with the system over time. However, social comparison theory proposes an 
additional information set which may be useful in assessing instrumentality: the effort and 
outcomes of referent individuals (Festinger, 1954).  Specifically, we suggest an extension to 
agency and expectancy theories by which the individual gathers information on instrumentality 
not only through their own historical interaction with the reward system, but also from observing 
the inputs and outcomes of a set of referent others.  
Within an organization implementing individual performance-based pay systems, total 
payouts “will inevitably vary across employees generating frequent pay comparisons between 
peers” (Larkin et al., 2012, p. 1201). This suggests that extending the individual nature of agency 
and expectancy theories to allow for individuals gathering information on instrumentality from a 
set of referent others may provide a more complete understanding of the functioning of 
individual incentives within a firm.  
 In informing the instrumentality of the performance-based pay system within an 
organization, we argue individuals look to a set of referent others. In order to elicit relevant 
information, an individual must be able to observe both the inputs to and outcomes of the 
individual incentive system. As the most direct comparison can be made between peers performing 
the same job within the same firm, we focus on the information set provided by observing 
horizontal pay dispersion, which refers to the spread between the magnitudes of compensation of 
employees within the same level of the firm (Bloom, 1999).4 Prior research on horizontal pay 
dispersion has shown its (main) effects on job satisfaction (J. Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), 
organizational commitment (J. Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), firm and individual performance (e.g., 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, some prior research examines vertical pay dispersion, the spread between compensation of 
individuals within different levels of the firm. This paper is only concerned with the pay dispersion defined here, 
horizontal pay dispersion. 
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Bloom, 1999; Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2001; Frick, Prinz, & 
Winkelmann, 2003; Grund & Westergaard-Nielsen, 2008; Jirjahn & Kraft, 2007; Siegel & 
Hambrick, 2005), product quality (Cowherd & Levine, 1992), higher acquisition premiums 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) and turnover (Bloom, 1999; J. Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992).  
Further, the literature on pay dispersion provides empirical support for both increased and 
decreased performance in the presence of pay dispersion, but comes to a consensus of an on 
average positive effect of pay dispersion in individual task settings but a negative effect in settings 
requiring more collaborative effort (see Downes & Choi, 2014 for a review). 
2.2 Moderating effect of overall pay dispersion on performance (H1) 
Expectancy theory predicts that for individual incentives to generate a change in behavior 
there must not only be a high-level of effort-outcome expectancy (i.e., if the employee increases 
effort it will results in increased performance) but also a high level of instrumentality (Vroom, 
1964). More specifically, the individual must believe that better performance will lead to a better 
outcome (e.g., increased payouts). Prior research has shown that this instrumentality exists under 
monetary incentive systems (Jorgenson & Dunnette, 1973; Locke & Latham, 1990; Pritchard, 
Leonard, Von Bergen, & Kirk, 1976) where individuals gather information on the relation between 
performance and pay through their own interactions with the system over time.  
We argue that individuals may also gather information on the instrumentality of the system 
by assessing a set of relevant peers. Because of its multiplicative nature, expectancy theory predicts 
that when instrumentality is greater, individual incentives are more effective. By observing 
horizontal pay dispersion, the instrumentality between performance and reward is highlighted and 
individuals are motivated to exert more effort to ‘obtain the prize of high pay’ (Bloom, 1999). 
Thus, individuals’ beliefs that changes in their own pay will be sensitive to their own performance 
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- a link that in expectation increases in realized incentive intensity - will be more salient if they are 
accompanied by individuals’ observations of high dispersion in their peers’ compensation.  This 
suggests that pay dispersion reinforces the positive incentive-performance link. Alternatively, and 
especially in collaborative work environments, pay dispersion has been shown to enhance the 
perceived inequity in the pay system (e.g., J. Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). In this case, we argue that 
pay dispersion results in a decreased ability of individuals to clearly map increased performance 
into meaningful differences in pay (i.e., instrumentality is decreased), suggesting that the 
incentive-performance link is dampened. In other words, observing large differences in referent 
others’ pay might lower individuals’ beliefs that their own performance-reward link will increase 
with higher incentive intensity, thus lowering the sensitivity of employees’ effort choices to the 
intensity of incentives. In sum, as both individual incentives and pay dispersion affect individual 
performance through the instrumentality channel, we expect that these two dimensions of the pay 
structure will work together to influence effort provision, and thus individual performance, 
however making no directional prediction.  
 H1: Pay dispersion moderates the relation between incentive intensity and individual 
performance. 
While we argue above that the variability in payouts inherent in performance-based 
incentive systems likely impacts their efficiency, this relation is likely more nuanced. Prior 
research suggests that employees’ perceptions of organizational justice, both distributive and 
procedural, play an important role in their response to the variability in outcomes generated in 
performance-based incentive systems. In particular, in the case of incomplete information 
regarding the payouts and resource allocation processes of referent others, fairness heuristic theory 
suggests that employees use available information on both the observed distribution as well as 
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perceived fairness in the allocation procedure to inform their response (Proudfoot & Lind, 2015; 
van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001). We first investigate the potential for the observed distribution 
in payouts to impact the effort provision response (H2), followed by an examination of perceived 
fairness in the pay distribution procedure on effort provision (H3).  
2.2.1 Perceived fairness in the pay distribution (H2) 
 Consistent with theory on distributive justice, prior research suggests that the effect of pay 
dispersion depends on the degree to which employees perceive the pay dispersion to be legitimate 
(Bloom, 1999). Research on pay dispersion suggests that the employee’s position in the 
distribution of pay may impact his perception of the equity in the outcomes to performance 
(Bloom, 1999). Specifically, consistent with the predictions of distributive justice theory, when an 
employee is near the bottom of the pay distribution he is more likely to perceive the distribution 
as inequitable which equity theory suggests would result in holding back effort. On the other hand, 
employees near the top of the distribution will more likely tolerate this perceived inequity in the 
pay system as it is outweighed by their overall larger reward. Empirical findings support these 
claims and frequently show a negative effect of dispersion for those lower in the pay distribution 
and a positive effect for those higher in the pay distribution (e.g., Bloom, 1999; Trevor & Wazeter, 
2006). As such, we suggest that the interactive effect of individual incentives and pay dispersion 
may depend on the individual’s position in the pay distribution. In particular, we expect that the 
positive effects of pay dispersion stemming from increased instrumentality, as described above, 
will dominate employee behavior in the group of employees in the higher part of the pay 
distribution, while the negative effects stemming from increased perceptions of unfairness will 
dominate behavior in the lower part of the pay distribution. More specifically, we expect that for 
employees who rank relatively higher in the pay distribution, the incentive effects of pay-for-
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performance schemes will increase with increasing pay dispersion given the more salient 
instrumentality due to employees’ beliefs that the observed pay differences are justified. In 
contrast, relatively low ranked employees are less likely to perceive the pay dispersion as 
legitimate. As a result, for employees in the lower part of the pay distribution increasing pay 
dispersion will decrease their beliefs that changes in performance will result in changes in pay for 
them, thereby weakening the performance effects of individual incentives. Stated formally, 
 H2a: Pay dispersion positively moderates the relation between incentive intensity and 
individual performance for employees in the upper part of the pay distribution. 
 H2b: Pay dispersion negatively moderates the relation between incentive intensity and 
individual performance for employees in the lower part of the pay distribution. 
2.2.2 Perceived fairness in the pay distribution procedure (H3) 
Fairness heuristic theory also suggests employees use perceptions of procedural justice to 
inform responses, especially in the case of incomplete information. Procedural justice refers to the 
extent to which resource allocation decisions are made in accordance with fundamental principles 
of justice.  In the performance-based incentive domain, prior research suggests that if employees 
perceive the resource allocation process as fair employees may not exhibit a strong negative 
reaction to the distribution of resources (Konovsky, 2000). We argue that the perceptions of 
fairness in the allocation procedure are likely formed by assessing how the variation in the resource 
allocation mirrors the variation in the observable productivity.  
Following this reasoning, recent research on horizontal pay dispersion has disaggregated 
HPD based on the source of the dispersion, that is, dispersion generated by productivity-based 
inputs and dispersion generated by non-productivity based inputs (Gupta et al., 2012; Shaw & 
Gupta, 2007; Trevor et al., 2012). We argue that these two types of dispersion provide different 
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sets of information to the employee making his effort allocation decision, most importantly 
because observed performance-based pay dispersion is typically considered legitimate by 
employees, while observed performance-unrelated pay dispersion is perceived as illegitimate.5  
 Turning to the differential effect of dispersion related to performance and dispersion 
related to non-performance based inputs, we argue that these different sources of dispersion likely 
differentially impact the relation between individual incentives and performance. Equity theory 
suggests that employees will adjust their effort levels to come in-line with their perceptions of 
fairness (Adams, 1965). Furthermore, expectancy theory requires a clear association between 
performance and outcome for an incentive to motivate increased effort (Vroom, 1964). Consistent 
with both expectancy and equity theories, we argue that the dispersion in pay generated by 
performance related inputs strengthens the signal that high levels of performance are rewarded and 
motivates the individual to exert more effort to “obtain the prize of high pay” (Bloom, 1999; Trevor 
et al., 2012; Vroom, 1964). In other words, we argue employees perceive the procedure of 
differentially allocating resources through differential performance to be fair. We therefore expect 
that the dispersion in pay explained by dispersion in performance provides employees with a social 
comparison that magnifies the importance of increased effort relative to the predictions of a 
standard agency theory model alone. On the other hand, pay comparisons can lead to strife when 
the employee perceives inequity in either inputs or outputs of the system. When dispersion exists 
within an incentive system and that dispersion is unrelated to actual observed performance, or at 
least perceived to be unrelated, it enhances the perceived inequity in the pay system, and we 
                                                 
5 Note that – in general - performance-unrelated pay dispersion does not per se mean unjustified pay differences. While 
not applicable to our setting, one source of performance-unrelated pay dispersion is the use of subjectivity in contract 
design. From an individual perspective, such adjustments might be legitimate as they, for example, capture an 
employee’s ability for the next job (e.g., Grabner & Moers, 2013), or could also be illegitimate due to, for example, 
favoritism (e.g., Moers, 2005). As others typically do not observe the sources of performance-unrelated pay dispersion, 
the perceptions of inequity remain regardless of whether the performance-unrelated pay dispersion is justified or not. 
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therefore expect a decrease in the willingness to provide effort. Relatedly, when an employee is 
confronted with the additional information of pay dispersion generated from non-performance 
related outputs, the incentive signal of how performance translates into pay is distorted, which we 
expect to diminish the perceived instrumentality. This suggests that employees view the resource 
allocation procedures not related to differences in performance to be unfair, eliciting a negative 
effort provision effect. In sum, we argue that the moderating effect of pay dispersion on the 
incentive performance relation will vary based on the underlying type of pay dispersion. Stated 
formally, 
 H3a: Performance-related pay dispersion positively moderates the relation between 
incentive intensity and individual performance. 
 H3b: Performance-unrelated pay dispersion negatively moderates the relation between 
incentive intensity and individual performance. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Site 
To empirically address our hypotheses, we conduct a field study with ABC Health, a for-
profit national healthcare firm headquartered in the United States who required anonymity in 
exchange for data access. The information presented in this section is based on interviews with top 
management, including the CEO, CFO, COO, Medical Director and the Controller, as well as 
several service providers working in different clinics, in addition to secondary documents received 
from ABC Health. The firm is publicly traded and owns approximately 450 operating units 
(clinics) across the country at the time of data collection. The firm has a market capitalization of 
approximately $3.3B and revenues of almost $1.5B, placing it within the S&P’s midcap group. 
The firm employs approximately 8,000 people nationally, over 1,800 of which are service 
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providers (the sample population). All data are collected directly from the firm’s internal 
accounting and HR systems. The advantage of using a research site such as this is that while we 
have gained access to a single firm, the sample size is quite large given that each of the 450 units 
operates alone and each of the 1,800 service provider’s performance is tracked individually.  These 
service providers provide similar services across all operating units and are guided by both 
regulations of their trade as well as firm policy. The final sample includes 27,680 service provider-
month observations representing 1,595 individual service providers from 285 unique operating 
units over 44 months.6 
3.2 The design of compensation contracts at ABC Health 
To understand (the variation in) our research site’s compensation system, it is important to 
understand the firm’s growth strategy. In particular, the operating strategy of ABC Health is to 
grow through the acquisition of new operating units. One challenge with this strategy, from a 
management standpoint, is that many of the systems (e.g., operating software) in place at the 
operating unit differ from those employed by ABC, requiring ABC’s management to decide 
whether to change the target’s systems to conform. During the acquisition process, the firm 
generally adopts the compensation scheme present at the time of purchase, while changing the 
organizational structure and IT systems to be consistent across units. That is to say that the 
compensation contracts of the acquired service providers remain largely unchanged while the 
organizational structure, job requirements, and decisions rights are homogenized across all units. 
Newly hired service providers who joined the acquired units after the integration, however, 
potentially received different contracts, which is another source of compensation scheme variation 
                                                 
6 Data spans a four-year period from 2006-2010. Service providers enter and leave this sample during the period. 
Analyses not relying on employment records data include all service providers employed by the firm during that 
month. Demographic data are available for a subset of employees, resulting in reduced sample sizes in tests utilizing 
these variables. 
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within the operating units.  It is important to note that, while differences in the parameters of the 
compensation contracts vary across individuals due to the firm’s acquisition policy as described 
above– the type of contract is consistent within the industry and therefore utilized in most units 
before and after the acquisition. The firm utilizes a so-called draw-against-commission contract 
for all service providers although the draw and commission rates vary. The contract provides 
performance-based pay at a fixed commission rate. However, with this contract, the firm attempts 
to smooth the income received by the employees by providing a guaranteed minimum monthly 
draw. The monthly draw amounts to the payout the employee would receive at the contracted 
commission rate and expected level of annual performance, that is, an expected amount of revenue 
generated per employee. If the employee performs under this expectation in a given month, they 
receive the guaranteed minimum but bank the “under performance”. In future periods, the 
employee must earn their expected performance level plus fully cover their negative balance before 
they begin receiving additional performance-based pay. An important feature of such contracts is 
that it – despite no changes to the contract itself – results in variation in the incentive intensity 
within individuals over time which we exploit in our alternative tests for our hypotheses. See 
Appendix B for further explanation and examples. 
When asking top management to substantiate the decision to refrain from aligning the 
compensation scheme within and across operating units, they emphasized the difficulties they 
faced during the various acquisition processes due to people’s general resistance to change. For 
almost every acquisition they had to change the computer system employed by the acquired unit, 
which by itself caused a lot of stress and required extensive training and a steep learning curve on 
part of the service providers. This is one reason why the firm typically left the basic compensation 
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scheme that the service providers had in the original unit in place to avoid further room for 
dissatisfaction during the transition phase.  
“Service providers communicate with each other fairly regularly, and a bumpy transition 
would  impair our ability to hire new service providers, especially new graduates”  
 
Interestingly, top management believed there to be no cost to this strategy, except for 
perhaps some increased processing on the back end (because the payroll team would have to 
process so many different contracts types). However, what the firm did not seem to take into 
account is that the differences in the structure of the compensation of employees of the same level 
within and across operating units created by this fragmented acquisition process represents a 
potential incentive problem often present in firms who utilize merger activity for growth. This 
concern is corroborated by both interviews with top management as well as the outcome of their 
annual employee satisfaction survey. Reflecting the typical unintended consequences of individual 
incentive schemes, employees noted potential dysfunctional behavior triggered by the production-
based compensation system: 
“Main dissatisfaction comes from production system which causes service providers to                       
fight with each other over cases”  
“The percentage compensation system affects medical decisions and team atmosphere in 
 some situations” 
“Compensation based only on production does not reward good management” 
“Production compensation does not always reward the hardest working employees” 
“Although having production pay is nice, it causes competition among service providers, 
stealing of appointments, and code changes in the computer system” 
 
While these quotes corroborate standard economic predictions regarding individual 
incentives schemes (such as the risk of sabotage, multi-tasking problems, or the impact of 
uncontrollable factors), employees also voice their concerns regarding the fairness of the particular 
system in place, thereby also revealing their consideration of their peers’ pay:   
“There is a lot of unfairness in the way our compensation is calculated”  
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“There is too much unfairness in the pay system for service providers” 
“We need more standardization of pay” 
“We should all be paid the same commission rate EQUALLY”   
“Service providers at my unit a shorter time receive more guaranteed compensation” 
“Production bonuses are not straight forward and not equal across the board” 
 
These quotes not only provide evidence that service providers are concerned with their peers’ pay, 
but also that they are indeed aware of how their peers are compensated, which is a necessary 
condition to study the effects of pay dispersion. Additionally, in the employee satisfaction survey, 
service providers are also asked to compare specific parts of their job (including pay) to others 
both internal and external to ABC Health. Routinely a very small percentage (<2%) report an 
inability to answer these questions due to the lack of awareness of other’s pay/benefits/hours 
worked/etc. We also interviewed regional managers to ask how aware they believed doctors to be 
regarding the pay of other doctors within the organization. These managers suggested that total 
pay was routinely discussed among doctors within a clinic and that this information spread beyond 
clinics at annual meetings, doctor training, and through job rating web sites. These managers 
further highlighted however, that the discussion of pay is focused on total pay and not the details 
of individuals’ contracts. Taken together, this suggests that doctors have the information necessary 
to assess the dispersion of total pay within their clinic.  
The features of the compensation policy at ABC Health provide us with an ideal setting to 
address our research question for a number of reasons. First, the combination of differences in both 
the design of contracts across individuals, as well as the features of the contract type itself, provides 
us with the unique opportunity to investigate the effects of incentive intensity within one firm, 
which typically is not possible due to the lack of variation in incentive intensity across individuals. 
Second, a unique feature of our setting is that a substantial part of the differences in pay is 
exogenously determined by the compensation schemes present in the operating units before 
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acquisitions and not determined by individual differences in the units, which helps us to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns.  Relatedly, having these different pay schemes within the same firm, and 
level within the firm allows us to test the differences in outcomes of these pay systems, while other 
variables are held constant within the firm. These service providers all perform the same job (i.e., 
no specialists) within the same level of the firm (i.e., clinic managers are excluded). Because the 
distribution in contracts was created by the acquisition process, it is less likely to be driven by 
omitted factors which also explain variation in pay, allowing us to more efficiently test the 
potential performance effects of pay dispersion. Third, to document effects of pay dispersion, 
employees must be aware of how others are compensated. Based on interviews with service 
providers as well as the outcome of the employee satisfaction survey as discussed above, we are 
confident that they are aware of the compensation of others across the firm and more specifically 
within their own operating units. Additionally, it is worthwhile to note that we are concerned here 
with the relation between incentives, pay dispersion and effort. The ideal research design would 
allow us to measure the direct outcome to pay dispersion and incentives, effort. However, in 
practice this variable is particularly difficult to capture. The current research setting, however, 
provides controls that increase the validity of operationalizing effort through performance. Prior 
research has demonstrated several variables which impact how effort translates into performance 
(see Bonner, 2007 for a review). The field setting used in this study examines service providers 
who are all doing the same job (i.e., the task is held constant), employed by the same firm (i.e., 
environment is held constant), and under the same promotion structure after receiving the same 
level of schooling (i.e., person variables are held constant). Together, this setting provides some 
comfort that measurable performance outcomes are highly correlated with the level of effort 
exerted by the individual. Finally, compensation contracts are not renegotiated annually. As such, 
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compensation contracts remain unchanged during the sample period diminishing the concern that 
performance could be driving pay (reverse causality).7 
Together, these qualities make ABC Health a unique research setting that can contribute to 
our understanding of horizontal pay dispersion, individual incentives, and their combined 
behavioral effects. 
4. Empirical Models 
4.1 Measurement of key variables 
We collect Production, a revenue-based variable that reflects the revenue generated by 
each individual service provider per month, directly from the firm. This is the only number used 
by the firm to determine employee’s commission-based compensation; no cost or profitability 
measures are used. Although the firm will not provide a full list of all services considered part of 
the revenue generated by the doctor for commission purposes, they do clarify that this list is 
standard across all clinics and is well-known by all doctors. In addition, while there are limited 
differences in pricing of these services across regions (but not across clinics within a region), we 
control for these differences with region fixed effects in cross-sectional specifications. 
We measure incentive intensity (IncentiveIntensity) monthly and define it as either PPS, 
the elasticity of TotalPay to Production, or PFP, measured as the ratio of performance-based pay 
(Commission) to Production. While the first measure captures how sensitive the total 
compensation payout to an individual is to a change in the level of production (PPS for pay-for-
performance sensitivity), the latter measure can be interpreted as dollars of performance-based pay 
received for every dollar of Production (PFP for pay-for-performance).  
                                                 
7 Less than one percent of the contracts are renegotiated during the period. These service providers are excluded 
from the sample. 
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Historically, pay dispersion studies rely on data from professional sports teams and 
typically use measures of dispersion such as the gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation in 
pay (Bloom, 1999). For our main specification, we rely on the gini coefficient which is commonly 
used in the economics literature to capture inequality in income distributions (Donaldson & 
Weymark, 1980). This measure ranges from zero to one capturing the range between total 
inequality and total equality in wages. Following prior literature, we construct the gini coefficient 
(Gini), as well as the coefficient of variation (COV) to be used in robustness tests, at the clinic 
month level.8  These measures capture the overall horizontal pay dispersion in the level of total 
pay present within a clinic in a given month.9 Measuring these variables at the clinic level provides 
the highest likelihood of awareness of payouts to others as well as reducing concerns about 
differences in pricing and demand for services impacting cross-sectional inferences. 
We argue above that an individual’s response to dispersion in pay is likely influenced by 
how legitimate he perceives the dispersion to be. We argue that dispersion arising from differences 
in effort are likely to be perceived as legitimate while dispersion arising from other sources is 
likely perceived as unfair. Because in our setting little else can be observed by our medical 
practitioners, including the full details of each person’s individual contracts, variation in payouts 
driven by differences in contracted commission rates, for example, would elicit feelings of unfair 
distribution procedures. As such, we use the process in Trevor et al. (2012) to disentangle the part 
of the observed variance in total payout the employee likely perceives to be associated with the 
observed variation in productivity. To the extent these payouts differ from expectations (based on 
                                                 
8 Calculations of all dispersion measures (Gini, COV, DEP, DUP) require a minimum of 3 service providers per 
clinic month. Clinic months with fewer than three observations are dropped. 
9 Clinics within the firm employ service providers at the same level and an administrative clinic manager. Clinics, 
do not, however, employ a clinic medical manager. The firm employs a medical manager for each region and for the 
firm overall. This suggests there is little relevant vertical pay dispersion within the firm for service providers. In the 
case regional medical managers are evaluated for vertical pay dispersion, we include controls for regional fixed 
effects. 
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the average relation between performance and pay for the sample), we argue employees perceive 
the distribution procedure as unfair. Following Trevor et al. (2012) we break pay dispersion down 
into dispersion arising from performance related inputs, referred to as dispersion in explained pay 
(DEP), which we argue will be viewed as legitimate, and dispersion related to non-performance 
based inputs, referred to as dispersion in unexplained pay (DUP), which we argue will be viewed 
as unfair.  Specifically, we model DEP and DUP using pooled regressions of individual logged 
total pay (ln_TotalPay) as a function of both individual inputs and time as follows: 
ln_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡          (1) 
Each service provider’s predicted value of total pay (?̂?i,t) represents his expected level of pay given 
how performance is rewarded on average throughout the firm. Consistent with the argument in 
Downes and Choi (2014), we note that this disaggregation represents a statistical way to 
conceptualize the employees’ reaction to observable variance in individual performance and 
individual pay. While we agree that this disaggregation may not perfectly reflect the actual 
underlying proportion of performance and non-performance related dispersion in pay and 
acknowledge that non-performance based dispersion is not per se unjustified, we do argue the 
disaggregation reflects the average employee’s perception of the proportion of observed pay 
dispersion arising from performance and non-performance related inputs, which then affects their 
perceptions of the fairness (legitimacy) of the observed pay dispersion.10 
The average R-squared from this regression is 92 percent suggesting that the large majority 
of the variation in total pay is a function of the variation in individual performance. DEP then is 
simply the variance of the predicted values of individual pay levels for all service providers in a 
                                                 
10 We have also estimated DEP and DUP using additional demographic controls (as presented in Equation (2)), 
thereby accounting for individual-specific factors that might be considered in the ex-ante contract design decisions. 
Our inferences regarding both the main and interactive effects of these types of pay dispersion remain unchanged 
(untabulated). 
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single clinic-month (𝜎?̂?𝑖,𝑡
2 ). Calculation of DUP again uses the model above, but uses residuals (ei,t) 
from the model instead of fitted values. Specifically, the residual term from Equation (1) represents 
pay that is independent of observable performance-related input. As such, DUP, measured as the 
variance in these residuals, represents dispersion in pay unrelated to performance for all service 
providers in a single-clinic month (𝜎𝑒𝑖,𝑡
2 ).11 
We anticipate employees use expectations of instrumentality in the coming period to make 
effort provision decisions. We argue these expectations are formed largely by assessing 
instrumentality based on (recent) experience, and thus we proxy for all incentive intensity and 
dispersion measures using historical information.12  As the information from the prior month is 
arguably most salient to employees, we first use a measure capturing only the most recent month 
of data. We also form three-month rolling averages to account for the possibility that people assess 
instrumentality with a longer timeframe in mind.13 Full variable descriptions can be found in 
Appendix A.  
4.2 Empirical specification 
We posit a moderating effect of pay dispersion on the relation between incentive intensity 
and individual performance (H1). To test this, we use an unbalanced panel containing individual 
performance, individual pay, and dispersion variables monthly over a maximum of 44 months. 
Our main specification utilizes cross-sectional differences in incentive intensity and horizontal 
                                                 
11 In addition to this methodology, we use an alternative specification to disentangle performance and non-
performance related dispersion in the Sensitivity Analyses section. 
12 To the extent expectations of future instrumentality deviate from historical predictions, our proxy for expected 
instrumentality biases against our finding results. To further assess whether our results are robust to an alternative 
proxy for expected incentive intensity and create a more forward looking proxy of expected incentive intensity - we 
add cumulative negative bank balances to the required level of performance before calculating our incentive 
intensity measures. Our inferences are robust to this design decision and suggest that historical time series estimates 
provide an adequate proxy for individuals’ expectations of instrumentality.  
13 In untabulated tests, we additionally consider a longer aggregation window of six months and our inferences 
remain. 
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pay dispersion across individuals and clinics. While this specification eases concerns that 
variation in incentive intensity and dispersion are driven by performance, it does not rule out 
issues with self-selection and alternative explanations relating to underlying differences in 
individuals (e.g., ability). While the institutional features in this setting (i.e., acquisition activity) 
help reduce endogeneity concerns and we include individual demographic controls to lessen 
these concerns, there is still a possibility that differential performance and/or individual 
characteristics were rewarded with different contracts at the start of employment (with the pre-
acquisition firm). To further limit these concerns, we exploit the fact that incentive intensity also 
varies within an individual over time and employ a person fixed effects specification as an 
alternative test for all of our models. While this specification eases concerns regarding individual 
characteristics, it potentially suffers more from variation in these variables arising from 
differences in actual performance. Each specification has different strengths and weaknesses in 
isolating the relation between performance and incentive intensity and performance and 
dispersion separately (and more importantly together). We argue that the common inferences 
drawn from these two specifications helps to suggest that variation in incentive intensity and 
dispersion, and importantly their interaction, are associated with variation in individual 
performance.14 
To begin, we model individual performance in a cross-sectional specification utilizing 
demographic controls as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘,𝑡−1 +
                                𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑘,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑘,𝑡−1 +
                                                 
14 More direct tests of potential endogeneity concerns, including self-selection, are presented in the Sensitivity 
Analyses section. 
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                               ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑟 +
                              ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (2) 
where subscript i denotes an individual service provider in clinic k in month t. The dependent 
variable, monthly production (Production), is the revenue generated by each individual service 
provider per month. We measure incentive intensity (IncentiveIntensity) monthly and define it as 
either PPS, the elasticity of TotalPay to Production, or PFP, measured as the ratio of the level of 
performance contingent compensation to the level of Production. Dispersion is measured as the 
Gini coefficient, as defined above. To identify the effect of incentive intensity and pay dispersion 
on employees’ future effort choices, we use the lag of these variables. Using demographic data 
collected from firm employment records we employ a pooled cross-sectional specification 
controlling for the employees’ experience in the field (ExpinField), experience with the firm 
(ExpwithFirm), gender (Female), and ethnic background (set of ethnicity indicators). All models 
further include month fixed effects, standard errors clustered by clinic, and all variables of interest 
are mean-centered to facilitate in interpreting regression coefficients. Because differences in 
pricing and demand for services may impact both dispersion and production measures, we include 
region fixed effects in all cross-sectional specifications. To further alleviate concerns our results 
are influenced by these differences, we again note our dispersion variables are measured at the 
clinic level where pricing and demand are unlikely to vary. In addition to this cross-sectional 
specification, we also employ a person fixed effects specification where we exclude the 
demographic control variables and replace region indicators with the vector of person indicators.  
 To address hypotheses 2a and 2b, we split the sample at the median of the distribution of 
total compensation payouts at the clinic month level, and reestimate Equation (2) in both sub-
samples. Observations at the median are dropped. Prior literature relies on the position in the pay 
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distribution to proxy for the perceived legitimacy of the firm’s compensation policy and the 
resulting pay distribution.15 To address H3a and H3b, we replace our measure of overall dispersion 
Gini by both DEP and DUP, as well as add the corresponding interaction terms.  
 5. Results 
5.1 Sample 
 Our sample is composed of 27,680 employee-month observations spanning 44 months 
between 2006-2010. This constitutes 1,595 unique service providers and 285 unique clinics. We 
collect individual performance and compensation details directly from firm records. The firm was 
also able to provide (through their employee satisfaction survey data) demographic data on a subset 
of their employees (11,304 employee-months) covering 495 unique service providers from 212 
unique clinics.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of service provider months. 
These providers produce on average $36,945 in monthly revenue16 for the firm and receive total 
monthly pay of $8,089 with $5,762 paid as a guaranteed draw (Salary). This suggests that the firm 
pays on average $0.22 in total compensation for every dollar of revenue the service provider 
generates. Panel B presents additional variables collected for a subsample of the service providers 
with demographic data and shows service providers are 37 percent male,17 have an average of 12.6 
                                                 
15 Using questions on satisfaction with pay processes at the firm, collected in the firm’s annual employee satisfaction 
survey, we validate that employees in the upper part of the pay distribution display a significantly higher level of 
satisfaction with pay processes than their peers in the lower part of the pay distribution (difference in mean 
satisfaction with pay 0.133, p-value <0.001). 
16 This is not the only revenue generated by the firm. A significant amount of revenue is generated from services not 
associated with the service provider. This would be equivalent to ancillary services in a hospital setting (e.g., rooms, 
food, prescriptions). 
17 Statistics show that this field is becoming substantially more female dominated. In 2007, new providers were split 
almost seventy-five percent female and twenty-five percent male (McPheron, 2007). This sample split is likely due 
to the composition of the population and not sampling bias. Additionally, sensitivity analyses show that the main 
independent variables do not differ significantly based on gender. 
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years of experience in the field and approximately 4.97 years with the current firm. Each clinic 
employs an average of 5.5 service providers.  
 Table 1 Panel C presents correlations among the variables of interest. Consistent with the 
incentive effect of performance-based monetary incentives, there is a significant and positive 
correlation between both PPS and PFP and performance (Productiont). We also report a positive 
correlation between performance and overall pay dispersion (Gini). These positive correlations 
could however, be an artifact of dispersion being greater in settings with high levels of incentive 
intensity. To better understand the relation between these variables, we proceed to the multivariate 
analyses below. 
 Lastly, in Table 1 Panel D we cross-tabulate employees’ position in the pay distribution 
and employees’ position in the performance distribution (above and below the median within their 
clinics). As expected, the majority of the observations can be found in the diagonal, that is, 
employees typically rank below the median (48%) or above the median (33%) on both variables. 
However, it is also important to note that approximately 20% of the observations are in the off-
diagonal; in 10% of the cases high earners are low performances, while for another 10% the 
opposite is the case.  
5.2 Moderating effect of overall pay dispersion on performance(H1) 
 Table 2 presents the results of testing the moderating effect of overall dispersion on the 
individual incentive performance relation. Panel A presents the results of estimating Equation (2) 
using a pooled cross-section, two measures of incentive intensity: PPS in Columns (1-2) and PFP 
in Columns (3-4), and additional controls for demographic differences in service providers as well 
as region fixed effects to control for pricing differences across the country. Additionally, we use 
dispersion and incentive intensity variables representing the prior month’s level (Columns (1) and 
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(3)) as well as the average of the prior three-months levels (Columns (2) and (4)). Panel B presents 
the results of estimating Equation (2) using a person fixed effects specification (replacing 
demographic control variables and region fixed effects with person fixed effects). 
The results in Panel A show that in all specifications we document a positive relation 
between the level of incentive intensity and future individual performance, consistent with prior 
literature and agency theory predictions. These results suggest that an increase in incentive 
intensity (PFP) over the prior three months of one standard deviation is associated with over a 
13% increase in performance (approximately $4,700 in a month). Additionally, we provide 
evidence of a positive and significant main effect of dispersion in all specifications although 
smaller in economic magnitude than the incentive intensity effects (one standard deviation 
increased in Gini is associated with an 5.2% increase in performance). This finding is consistent 
with the tournament theory perspective of dispersion and makes sense given the individual (non-
collaborative) nature of the service provider’s work. In addition, and consistent with our 
expectations, we document a significant positive interaction between incentive intensity and 
dispersion. This interaction suggests that the effect of individual incentives is intensified in the 
presence of pay dispersion. Specifically, holding PFP and Gini at the mean and increasing PFP 
by one standard deviation intensifies the effect of individual incentives by over 21%, representing 
additional monthly Production of over $7,700 for the same level of dispersion. These inferences 
hold when measuring incentive intensity as either PFP or PPS. Additionally, the results hold under 
differing intervals for measuring dispersion and incentive intensity.  
Moving to Panel B, using the full sample of service provider months, we utilize a person 
fixed effects specification to help rule out self-selection concerns by utilizing within person 
variation in incentive intensity and dispersion over time. Our results continue to demonstrate a 
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significant positive main effect of both incentive intensity, measured as either PFP or PPS, as well 
as overall pay dispersion. In addition, we also continue to document a significant and positive 
interaction term between overall pay dispersion and incentive intensity.  
Taken together, the results in Table 2 provide the first evidence of a significant and 
economically meaningful moderating effect of horizontal pay dispersion on the relation between 
incentive intensity and individual performance. These results further suggest that employees 
respond both to the somewhat more stable cross-sectional differences in incentive intensity as well 
as to time-series differences in implied incentive intensity. This finding has implications for 
contract design using this “draw-against-commission” design, whereby principals must consider 
both the contractual incentive intensity as well as the implied incentive intensity created by 
variations in commission payouts due to the negative banking of performance.  
5.2.1 Position in the distribution of pay (H2) 
 To investigate whether the moderating role of pay dispersion varies by the position of the 
employee in the distribution of pay, we estimate Equation (2) separately on sub-samples of 
individuals high and low in the distribution of pay. We create the pay partition using a median split 
on TotalPay by clinic in the prior month. Table 3 Panel A presents the results of estimating 
Equation (2) separately in both subsamples using both measures of incentive intensity.18 
Specifically, we continue to document a positive main effect of the level of incentive intensity 
across both subsamples, although the effect size is considerably larger in the group of individuals 
above the median in the pay distribution (significant at the 1% level). In the above median group, 
we also continue to document a positive main effect of overall pay dispersion, as well as a positive 
                                                 
18 In addition to this specification, we also use seemingly unrelated regression analysis to estimate the model in each 
subsample and compare coefficients across them. Although untabulated, the results suggest differences in the 
coefficients on each of our main variables of interest across the high and low performing sub-samples (e.g., PPS, 
Gini, PPS*Gini) for each specification at the 1% level. 
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interaction coefficient (using PFP) suggesting that pay dispersion magnifies the effect of 
individual incentives in this group (in support of H2a). However, in the group of individuals falling 
below the median in the pay distribution, we find evidence of a negative main effect of overall 
dispersion, as well as a negative coefficient on the interaction between incentive intensity and 
dispersion (using PFP) (in support of H2b). This result suggests that in the below-median group 
dispersion dampens the effect of individual incentives at motivating performance.  
Moving to Panel B, we continue to document the positive main effect of incentive intensity 
in both subsamples. Further, we document both the positive main effect and positive interaction 
effect between incentive intensity and dispersion (using both incentive intensity measures) in the 
subset of individuals above the median in the pay distribution. In addition, in the low subsample, 
we continue to document both the negative main effect and negative interaction effect found in 
Panel A. Taken together, these results suggest that the perceived fairness in the distributional 
outcome, as proxied by position in the pay distribution, impacts the effectiveness of individual 
incentives in the presence of horizontal pay dispersion. 
5.2.2 Performance Related/Unrelated Horizontal Dispersion in Pay (H3) 
To estimate the potential differential effects of performance-related and performance-
unrelated pay dispersion, we estimate Equation (2) including both dispersion measures as well as 
the interactions between each measure and incentive intensity.19 The results of these tests are 
presented in Table 4 Panel A using a pooled cross-sectional specification. The results in Panel A 
continue to show a positive main effect of individual incentives on performance. Consistent with 
the literature on pay dispersion, we also document a positive and significant main effect of 
                                                 
19 We include both DEP and DUP simultaneously in the same model. Although the correlation between these 
variables is only 22%, to alleviate concerns their simultaneous inclusion might create multicollinearity issues, we 
note the average variance inflation factor in these models does not exceed two. 
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dispersion related to performance (DEP) but a significant negative effect for the level of dispersion 
unrelated to performance (DUP). Supporting H3a, we also document a positive and significant 
interaction effect between incentive intensity and the level of dispersion related to performance. 
In support of H3b, we provide evidence of a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
between incentive intensity and the level of dispersion unrelated to performance. Further, Panel B 
shows consistent results using the full sample of practitioner months and a person fixed effects 
specification. Taken together, the results in Table 4 show that perceptions of the origin of the pay 
dispersion has a decisive impact on the effectiveness of incentive compensation.  
6. Sensitivity Analyses 
 We take a number of additional steps to test the robustness of our results. First, we test the 
sensitivity of our results to alternative measurement of our key variables. Although the contract 
design allows for time-series variation in implied incentive intensity within an individual over 
time, it is possible that the only salient incentive intensity in the effort provision decision is the 
time invariant contracted commission rate. Because this measure only allows for cross-sectional 
variation, we test whether our inferences hold using the contracted commission rate in Table 5 
Panel A1. These results show that performance is positively and significantly related to the 
contracted commission rate and importantly we document a significant positive interaction effect 
between dispersion and incentive intensity, as measured by the contracted commission rate. 
Alternatively, prior research has considered the pay mix, that is the ratio of variable to total pay 
(PctCommission), as an indication of incentive strength (e.g., Zenger & Marshall, 2000). In Table 
5 Panels A1 and A2, we provide a replication of our main results using this alternative measure of 
incentive intensity. Specifically, we continue to see both a positive main effect of incentive 
intensity as well as a significant positive interaction between incentive intensity and overall 
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dispersion. In Table 5 Panels B1 and B2, we also use an alternative measure for overall pay 
dispersion, that is, the coefficient of variation (COV) (Bloom, 1999). Our results continue to show 
a main effect of overall pay dispersion using this alternative measures, as well as a significant 
positive interaction.  
In addition, we also use an alternative way of decomposing overall pay dispersion into the 
performance and performance-unrelated portions.  Following prior literature, in our main tests we 
use a pooled regression specification to identify the portion of dispersion associated with 
performance and the dispersion unrelated to performance (Trevor et al., 2012). As an alternative 
way to isolate the dispersion driven by performance and that that arises from other inputs, we 
disaggregate the coefficient of variation (COV) for overall dispersion. Using the same 
methodology, we construct a coefficient of variation of performance within a clinic month. We 
use this variable to capture dispersion in pay related to performance. We then create a second 
variable representing performance-unrelated dispersion by subtracting the clinic month dispersion 
in performance from the clinic month dispersion in pay. Using these alternative measures of 
DEP/DUP our inferences regarding the effects of these two variables are unchanged (untabulated). 
 Next, while the institutional characteristics of this setting (i.e., acquisition activity) help 
reduce endogeneity concerns, there is still a possibility that differential performance was rewarded 
with differential contract types at the start of employment. While we document that our inferences 
hold using a person-fixed effects specification this may not completely rule out self-selection 
concerns. To further address these concerns, we use control variables collected from employment 
records as instruments for determining the level of incentive intensity in a two-stage least squares 
regression specification. The second stage model mimics Equation (2) but replaces 
IncentiveIntensity with the predicted value from the stage one model. In untabulated results, our 
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inferences remain unchanged using this specification and predicted values of the level of incentive 
intensity. 
Finally, given our results on the differential impact of overall pay dispersion across a 
partition on the position in the pay distribution, in an exploratory analysis we investigate whether 
that difference remains when investigating dispersion related and unrelated to performance. 
Specifically, we estimate Equation (2) including both the main and interaction effects of 
DEP/DUP separately on the subsamples of above and below the median earners using a person 
fixed effects specification. The results (untabulated) mimic those in Table 4 with two-tailed 
significance at traditional levels for all variables (with the exception of the PPS*DUP interaction 
in the above median pay group). These results suggest that regardless of the position in the 
distribution, the incentive effect of performance-based pay is magnified by performance related 
dispersion and mitigated by dispersion unrelated to performance.  
7. Limitations 
One limitation of this study stems first from the method employed. While the research site 
presents an interesting setting to test the hypotheses, it is a single firm within a single industry, 
which potentially limits the generalizability of results. Economic research has shown that 
healthcare firms often behave differently than other industries in relation to business strategy. 
Specifically, incentives in the clinic environment may be theoretically different due to the 
relationship between service providers, clinics, and patients. The service provider first has a 
responsibility to the patient to provide the best care, but he has also entered into contracts with the 
clinic itself (Harris, 1977). This creates a contracting dilemma: if incentives are provided to the 
service provider based on an overall production number he is incentivized to prescribe expensive 
tests (Andersen & Company, 1977). On the other hand, if incentives are based on efficiency he 
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may be incentivized to provide less than the standard of care. These differences, however, do not 
seem to impact the effectiveness of incentives, as the health care industry suffers from the same 
mixed incentive performance results as the economy as a whole (see Armour et al., 2001; Conrad 
et al., 1998; Hillman, Pauly, & Kerstein, 1989). A second limitation is that employees may not 
know how others are compensated. The firm employs a no disclosure compensation policy, but 
employee satisfaction survey and interview results suggest pervasive awareness of others 
compensation. Interestingly, when top management received the results of the employee 
satisfaction survey, they were shocked to see how dissatisfied the service providers were with 
compensation, and especially the comparisons they were making to others. Sitting in a meeting 
with the researchers, the COO wondered:   
“How can this be? We tell them plainly it is against policy to communicate your 
 compensation package to anyone else in the firm!” 
If employees are in fact unaware of others compensation, this lack of knowledge of the 
differences in pay would bias against our finding results (i.e., pay dispersion would have no effect). 
Moreover, our findings suggest that even in the absence of formal pay transparency policies 
employees are aware of others pay and use this information to make social comparisons. 
However, this research site provides several useful advantages. The biggest advantage is the 
variation in incentive intensity both across individuals and within individuals over time while 
holding constant other potentially important firm specific performance determinants. While there 
is self-selection into the clinics before ABC Health acquires them, after the purchase pay systems 
remains largely unchanged. During the course of this study (forty-four months) only thirty-eight 
contract renegotiations occurred (out of a possible 38,363). Additionally, ABC uses no explicit 
form of relative performance evaluation. Contracts are determined individually, contain no 
bonuses (apart from performance dependent commissions), and are kept in place for long periods 
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of time (greater than five years on average). This helps to lessen concerns of endogeneity and 
reverse causality.  
8. Conclusions 
This study utilizes a unique setting strongly suited for better understanding how incentives 
function in a real-world environment, likely deviating from the predictions of agency theory. 
Specifically, we add to existing evidence on how incentives function in practice by expanding our 
knowledge on how horizontal pay dispersion impacts the effectiveness of individual incentives. 
Using panel data collected from a field setting, we document the significant impact of individual 
incentives on performance. However, even in an environment where the individual incentives are 
highly effective, we are able to isolate a moderating effect of horizontal pay dispersion. Further, 
we show that pay dispersion has a reinforcing effect on the incentive-performance link when it is 
more likely to be considered legitimate, while it decreases the incentive effects when it is likely 
considered as unfair.  
Our results suggest that understanding the moderating effects of social comparisons is 
important in practice; however, this is often difficult to study academically, as data on both 
dispersion and monetary incentives is often limited to high-level executives. Understanding the 
impact of pay dispersion in that group however, is often less meaningful as their pay levels 
converge, responsibilities diverge, and individual performance is difficult to measure. The current 
setting provides a unique opportunity to study how characteristics inherent in implementing an 
individual performance-based pay system in practice may affect its effectiveness. 
Relatedly, this study adds to our understanding of a potential unintended consequence of 
recent calls for increased transparency in pay. Although our sample firm does not have an explicit 
pay transparency policy, and even discourages pay transparency, our results suggest employees 
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are largely aware of the pay of others and use this social comparison information in their effort 
provision decisions. This suggests then that pay transparency, at least as measured by the 
disclosure of pay levels, exists without a formal policy. Coupled with the differential performance 
results stemming from dispersion perceived as legitimate and that perceived as illegitimate, our 
field study suggests that the transparency that may benefit the firm is in effectively communicating 
the firm’s compensation policies, specifically how pay is related to performance and the potential 
sources of discretionary adjustments. 
Overall, this study adds to our knowledge of how additional constructs, explicitly those 
generated within the incentive system itself, impact the incentive system design and the 
effectiveness of the system in generating increased performance. Specifically, our study suggests 
that understanding the role of social comparisons is vital to the efficient function of performance-
based compensation systems. Further, our findings suggest that perhaps pay transparency occurs 
naturally and that more important disclosure from the firm manages the legitimacy of dispersion 
naturally occurring in compensation systems that utilize individual incentives. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Production 
Monthly revenue from procedures generated by each individual service provider (in 
000’s). This reflects revenue from procedures performed by the service provider 
and is the only variable the firm uses to compensate these service providers. This 
data is collected directly from firm records. 
TotalPay 
This is the total amount of gross monthly take home pay each service provider 
received. This is composed of monthly salary and commissions (incentive-based 
pay) and is collected directly from firm records. 
Salary 
This is the monthly salary each service provider receives and is collected directly 
from firm records. This is also referred to as guaranteed draw in our institutional 
features descriptions. 
Commission 
This is the total commission each service provider receives and is collected directly 
from firm records. Commission paid reflects both the contracted commission rate as 
well as adjustments made for current or past performance below the minimum 
threshold (negative carry over). 
PctCommission 
The ratio of the commission received by the service provider in the current period 
scaled by the total take home pay (Commission/TotalPay). 
PFP 
The ratio of the commission received by the service provider in the current period 
scaled by the total revenue generated by that provider during the current month 
(Commission/Production). 
PPS The elasticity of TotalPay to Production (%ΔTotalPayt-1t/%ΔProductiont-1t). 
COV 
The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of 
TotalPay within a given clinic month scaled by the mean level of TotalPay within 
the same clinic month. This variable varies both across clinics as well as over time. 
We measure this variable using a single month of outcomes but in addition to the 
dispersion in a single month we also create three and six month rolling averages of 
the level of dispersion. 
 
Gini 
The Gini coefficient is defined following Bloom (1999), ranges from zero to one, 
and is calculated at the clinic month level. This variable varies both across clinics as 
well as over time. We measure this variable using a single month of outcomes but 
in addition to the dispersion in a single month we also create three and six month 
rolling averages of the level of dispersion. 
 
DEP 
As defined by Trevor et al. (2012), we estimate the predicted values of a pooled 
regression (including all sample observations) of logged TotalPay on individual 
performance in t and t-1 and time fixed effects. We define dispersion in expected 
pay (DEP) as the variance of these predicted values within an individual clinic 
month. We measure this variable using a single month of outcomes but in addition 
to the dispersion in a single month we also create three and six month rolling 
averages of the level of dispersion in expected pay. 
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DUP 
As defined by Trevor et al. (2012), we estimate the residuals of a pooled regression 
(including all sample observations) of logged TotalPay on individual performance 
in t and t-1 and time fixed effects. We define dispersion in unexpected pay (DUP) 
as the variance of these residuals within an individual clinic month. We measure 
this variable using a single month of outcomes but in addition to the dispersion in a 
single month we also create three and six month rolling averages of the level of 
dispersion in expected pay. 
Female 
This is an indicator variable, taking on the value of one if the service provider is 
female as indicated in firm employment records. 
ExperienceinField 
Number of years since the service provider has received his terminal degree (as 
noted in firm employment records), measured at the end of the month.  
ExperiencewithFirm 
Number of years employed at ABC Health (as indicated in firm employment 
records), measured at the end of the month.  
Size 
This is a measure of size of each clinic, measured as the number of service 
providers employed by each clinic in a given month collected from firm records. 
African American 
This is an indicator variable, taking on the value of one if the service provider is 
African American as indicated in firm employment records. 
Asian 
This is an indicator variable, taking on the value of one if the service provider is 
Asian as indicated in firm employment records. 
Caucasian 
This is an indicator variable, taking on the value of one if the service provider is 
Caucasian as indicated in firm employment records. 
Hispanic 
This is an indicator variable, taking on the value of one if the service provider is 
Hispanic as indicated in firm employment records. 
Other 
This is an indicator variable, taking on the value of one if the service provider is not 
of one of the listed racial classifications as indicated in firm employment records. 
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Appendix B – Description of Contracts at ABC Health 
 
ABC Health employs a specific type of compensation contract, common to their industry and 
salespeople in general. This contract is typically referred to as a draw against commission. In this 
contract each individual is guaranteed a minimum monthly take home pay, while also being 
incentivized to exert effort toward performance with additional commission pay. The firm would 
like to achieve annual compensation consistent with an annual payout of a given percentage of 
the employee’s total production. (Note that production is measured as the revenue generated by 
each individual service provider per month. This is the only metric used by the firm to determine 
employee’s commission-based compensation; no cost or profitability measures are used.) 
However, the firm must make compensation payments on a normal schedule throughout the year 
before total actual annual performance is realized. As such, to smooth income, the firm provides 
a minimum monthly take-home pay equal to the given percentage payout of the expected annual 
performance. If the employee exceeds the monthly proportion of the expected annual 
performance, the employee receives additional compensation (above the guarantee) at the given 
rate (commission). If, however, the employee’s performance in a month is below the monthly 
expectation, the employee takes home his guaranteed minimum. However, the amount of “under 
performance” is banked. In the following month, the employee must meet his expected level of 
performance as well as cover the prior period “under performance” before the firm pays 
commission on the performance above the monthly expectation. This system generates shifts in 
the incentive intensity for an individual over time, without altering the base contract. 
Specifically, the level of performance that must be achieved to earn commission above the 
guaranteed level of pay shifts over time altering the intensity of the performance based incentive. 
 
As an example, the base contract is as follows: the employee is expected to generate revenue of 
$600,000 in a year. This says then that the employee should be producing monthly revenue of 
$50,000. Additionally, the firm would like to compensate the employee at a rate of $0.20 for 
every dollar in revenue the employee generates. As such, the target compensation for this 
employee for the year is $120,000 ($10,000/month). The firm will guarantee a payout to this 
employee of $10,000/month. Any revenue the employee generates above the $600,000 will be 
compensated at a rate of $0.20/dollar of revenue he generates. 
 
Basic Contract: 
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Cross-Sectional Variation: Because of the acquisition process the firm has cross-sectional 
variance in both the guaranteed draw amount as well as the annual commission rate. This also 
creates cross-sectional variation in the intensity of the incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For an Individual Over Time: Because of the draw against commission system utilized by the 
firm, we also see variation in incentive intensity over time for an individual. 
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       $57,000 
Total Pay: 11,400 (Base Draw of 10,000 + 
20% of production over $55K (because of 
negative bank in prior period)) 
PFP: 0.025 (1,400/57,000) 
PPS: 0.117 ([11,400-10,000]/[57,000-
45,000]) 
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Monthly Production 
Total Pay: 10,000 (Base Draw of 10,000 + 
no commission) 
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51,000]) 
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TABLE 1 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Full Sample 
  Full Sample 
  N Mean Median SD 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
TotalPay 27,680 8,089.04 7,373.00 3,566.82 5,867.50 9,540.50 
Salary 27,680 5,762.94 5,571.00 2,953.61 4,462.00 6,813.00 
Commission 27,680 2,323.45 1,168.00 3,142.00 0.00 3,599.50 
Production(in 000’s) 27,680 36.945 35.025 15.808 26.177 45.121 
PPS 27,680 0.496 0.627 0.730 0.000 1.021 
PFP 27,680 0.053 0.034 0.063 0.000 0.084 
Size 27,680 5.973 5.000 3.777 3.000 7.000 
Gini 27,680 0.154 0.147 0.075 0.094 0.208 
DEP 27,680 0.104 0.064 0.111 0.027 0.144 
DUP 27,680 0.059 0.030 0.083 0.009 0.079 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Demographic Data SubSample 
  Demographic Data SubSample 
  N Mean Median SD 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
TotalPay 11,304 7,982.45 7,263.50 3,513.95 5,769.00 9,394.50 
Salary 11,304 5,564.72 5,438.00 2,845.09 4,421.50 6,593.00 
Commission 11,304 2,415.58 1,528.50 2,921.11 0.00 3,763.50 
Production(in 000’s) 11,304 37.588 35.950 15.515 26.852 46.168 
PPS 11,304 0.545 0.713 0.715 0.072 1.043 
PFP 11,304 0.056 0.043 0.061 0.000 0.088 
Size 11,304 5.475 4.000 3.218 3.000 7.000 
Gini 11,304 0.148 0.138 0.074 0.089 0.199 
DEP 11,304 0.094 0.054 0.108 0.023 0.125 
DUP 11,304 0.055 0.025 0.084 0.008 0.070 
Experience in Field 11,304 12.632 10.000 10.132 5.000 19.500 
Experience with Firm 11,304 4.965 4.000 4.070 2.000 7.000 
Female 11,304 0.632 1.000 0.482 0.000 1.000 
African American 11,304 0.014 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 
Asian 11,304 0.067 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.000 
Caucasian 11,304 0.849 1.000 0.358 1.000 1.000 
Hispanic 11,304 0.021 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.000 
Other 11,304 0.035 0.000 0.184 0.000 0.000 
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Panel C: Correlation Matrix 
  TotalPay Salary Commission Production PPS PFP Size Gini DEP DUP 
TotalPay 1.000          
Salary 0.557*** 1.000         
Commission 0.626*** -0.298*** 1.000        
Production 0.791*** 0.301*** 0.627*** 1.000       
PPS 0.081*** -0.142*** 0.226*** 0.172*** 1.000      
PFP 0.339*** -0.498*** 0.856*** 0.341*** 0.231*** 1.000     
Size 0.239*** 0.257*** 0.034*** 0.085*** -0.037*** 0.006 1.000    
Gini 0.186*** 0.116*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.003 0.053*** 0.422*** 1.000   
DEP 0.314*** 0.227*** 0.147*** 0.235*** -0.007 0.027*** 0.282*** 0.677*** 1.000  
DUP 0.068*** 0.108*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.064*** -0.017*** 0.240*** 0.424*** 0.221*** 1.000 
 
Panel D: Cross-tabulation of above/below median earners/performers 
  Hi_TotalPayt-1 Lo_TotalPayt-1 Total 
Hi_Productiont-1 
      13,287          2,512  
            15,799  
(48%) (9.08%) 
Lo_Productiont-1 
        2,615          9,266  
            11,881  
(9.45%) (33.48%) 
Total       15,902        11,778              27,680  
 
 
Notes: Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 27,680 service provider-month observations and Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 11,304 
service provider-month observations for employment record data. Panel C presents Pearson correlations of the variables of interest. Panel D presents the cross tabulation of the 
number of individuals falling above (Hi) and below (Lo) the median in TotalPay and CurrentProduction.  Full sample is used when it is available for both variables in the 
correlation. Variable descriptions are found in Appendix A. All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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TABLE 2 
Panel A: Regressions of Performance on Incentive Intensity and Pay Dispersion using Pooled 
Cross-Section and Additional Controls 
 
 dv=Productiont 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 3.686*** 4.462*** 66.063*** 73.508*** 
 (10.70) (9.49) (7.40) (6.93) 
Ginilag 18.345*** 24.436** 18.054*** 25.326*** 
 (2.59) (2.47) (2.88) (2.74) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*Ginilag 7.620* 11.922** 264.449*** 313.596** 
 (1.94) (2.06) (2.83) (2.32) 
Sizelag -0.321 -0.389* -0.381* -0.442** 
 (-1.55) (-1.83) (-1.87) (-2.09) 
ExperienceinFieldt 0.030 0.030 -0.067 -0.076 
 (0.51) (0.51) (-1.17) (-1.26) 
ExperiencewithFirmt 0.408*** 0.419*** 0.447*** 0.475*** 
 (2.98) (3.00) (3.33) (3.42) 
Female -4.197*** -4.022*** -4.030*** -3.984*** 
 (-3.51) (-3.30) (-3.44) (-3.26) 
African American -5.347 -6.153 -3.469 -4.180 
 (-1.09) (-1.26) (-0.69) (-0.83) 
Asian 2.187 2.465 2.973 3.158 
 (0.53) (0.63) (0.70) (0.76) 
Caucasian 2.935 3.009 4.132 4.493 
 (0.79) (0.86) (1.06) (1.19) 
Hispanic 4.557 5.242 5.759 7.601 
 (0.88) (1.03) (1.12) (1.48) 
Other 2.925 2.585 4.156 4.216 
 (0.61) (0.57) (0.86) (0.88) 
Constant 35.224*** 32.833*** 32.555*** 35.328*** 
 (7.21) (6.80) (6.94) (7.46) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 11,304 10,080 11,304 10,080 
Adj. R2 23.50% 25.60% 25.80% 27.90% 
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Panel B: Regressions of Performance on Incentive Intensity and Pay Dispersion using Person 
Fixed-Effects Specification 
 
 dv=Productiont 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 1.264*** 1.274*** 66.456*** 85.662*** 
 (13.25) (10.85) (38.91) (37.86) 
Ginilag 5.634*** 7.207*** 6.656*** 9.254*** 
 (4.06) (3.68) (5.76) (5.73) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*Ginilag 4.557*** 7.677*** 124.430*** 191.167*** 
 (3.90) (4.82) (6.92) (7.58) 
Sizelag -0.395*** -0.505*** -0.366*** -0.488*** 
 (-6.50) (-7.97) (-6.35) (-8.04) 
Constant 40.964*** 39.953*** 35.263*** 39.665*** 
 (68.56) (68.36) (65.90) (69.35) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Person Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 27,680 24,048 27,680 24,048 
Adj. R2 2.17% 2.57% 6.71% 7.51% 
 
Notes: Table 2 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) in the full and demographic data subsamples. In 
each panel, Columns (1) and (2) use PPS as the measure of incentive intensity, while Columns (3) and (4) use 
PFP as the measure of incentive intensity. The even columns use one month windows to measure all variables of 
interest, while the odd columns use a rolling three-month window to measure the variable of interest. Variable 
descriptions are provided in Appendix A. All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
All variables of interest are mean-centered. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 3 Regressions of Performance on Incentive Intensity and Pay Dispersion using Median Split of Position in 
the Pay Distribution 
 
Panel A: Pooled Cross-Section with additional demographic controls 
 
 High Pay Distribution Subsample Low Pay Distribution Subsample 
 dv=Productiont dv=Productiont 
  PPS PFP PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 3.185*** 4.325*** 74.668*** 85.839*** 1.696*** 1.804*** 0.309 13.209* 
 (6.51) (6.20) (7.81) (8.07) (5.33) (4.67) (0.04) (1.65) 
Ginilag 50.217*** 63.079*** 38.695*** 58.037*** -16.902*** -17.561*** -25.059*** -25.350*** 
 (5.70) (5.11) (4.98) (5.83) (-3.42) (-2.60) (-5.20) (-4.13) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*Ginilag 0.715 9.691 374.851*** 480.555*** -1.976 -6.660 -298.775*** -265.987** 
 (0.12) (1.03) (3.34) (3.45) (-0.55) (-1.37) (-3.31) (-2.50) 
Sizelag -0.312 -0.527** -0.301 -0.547** 0.327* 0.396** 0.300* 0.322* 
 (-1.37) (-2.31) (-1.30) (-2.40) (1.86) (2.22) (1.72) (1.82) 
ExperienceinFieldt 0.120 0.100 -0.012 -0.036 -0.035 -0.022 -0.046 -0.048 
 (1.63) (1.36) (-0.17) (-0.47) (-0.80) (-0.46) (-1.01) (-1.00) 
ExperiencewithFirmt 0.306* 0.351** 0.379** 0.432*** 0.331*** 0.308*** 0.358*** 0.361*** 
 (1.87) (2.13) (2.45) (2.76) (3.08) (2.74) (3.35) (3.30) 
Female -4.567*** -4.062*** -4.735*** -4.407*** -2.114** -1.716* -1.913** -1.494 
 (-3.12) (-2.76) (-3.37) (-3.06) (-2.33) (-1.82) (-2.11) (-1.56) 
African American -0.980 -2.023 -3.840 -2.846 -3.492 -2.619 -3.652 -3.064 
 (-0.15) (-0.31) (-0.57) (-0.44) (-0.82) (-0.62) (-0.91) (-0.71) 
Asian 9.639 9.383* 8.458 10.231* -3.163 -1.957 -2.687 -2.293 
 (1.62) (1.66) (1.46) (1.93) (-0.81) (-0.50) (-0.71) (-0.58) 
Caucasian 7.690 7.050 7.700 9.188* -3.543 -2.528 -3.171 -2.795 
 (1.40) (1.34) (1.41) (1.84) (-0.98) (-0.70) (-0.92) (-0.76) 
Hispanic 9.214 10.277 10.895 13.344* -1.117 -0.621 -2.776 -0.226 
 (1.19) (1.38) (1.45) (1.83) (-0.25) (-0.14) (-0.64) (-0.05) 
Other 11.232* 10.111* 10.184* 11.986** -3.744 -3.198 -3.001 -3.121 
 (1.81) (1.69) (1.65) (2.07) (-0.88) (-0.75) (-0.76) (-0.73) 
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Constant 35.004*** 32.167*** 31.881*** 33.298*** 32.404*** 32.260*** 29.177*** 31.376*** 
 (4.73) (4.49) (4.95) (5.60) (7.26) (7.20) (6.95) (7.00) 
          
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 5,023 4,527 5,023 4,527 4,479 3,977 4,479 3,977 
Adj. R2 29.90% 32.60% 33.60% 37.00% 30.20% 31.90% 29.20% 30.60% 
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Panel B: Person fixed effects specification 
 
 High Pay Distribution Subsample Low Pay Distribution Subsample 
 dv=Productiont dv=Productiont 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  PPS PFP PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 0.869*** 0.708*** 67.343*** 85.632*** 0.688*** 0.898*** 27.562*** 38.936*** 
 (5.27) (3.50) (20.98) (20.70) (5.51) (5.72) (10.34) (11.44) 
Ginilag 19.120*** 22.397*** 13.096*** 18.094*** -9.334*** -9.707*** -9.835*** -10.449*** 
 (7.81) (6.52) (6.36) (6.35) (-5.03) (-3.64) (-5.91) (-4.53) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*Ginilag 3.529* 6.181** 127.888*** 177.560*** 1.602 3.618 -86.015*** -85.465** 
 (1.79) (2.30) (4.09) (4.09) (1.01) (1.64) (-3.21) (-2.30) 
Sizelag -0.600*** -0.737*** -0.519*** -0.613*** -0.381*** -0.436*** -0.344*** -0.413*** 
 (-5.60) (-6.66) (-5.07) (-5.79) (-4.55) (-4.97) (-4.35) (-4.81) 
Constant 51.704*** 51.369*** 43.924*** 48.034*** 32.752*** 31.725*** 27.656*** 30.949*** 
 (49.09) (49.43) (46.43) (47.54) (40.25) (39.08) (37.73) (38.67) 
          
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Person Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 11,827 10,409 11,827 10,409 11,528 9,968 11,528 9,968 
Adj. R2 -1.59% -2.05% 2.51% 2.72% -3.10% -3.41% -2.00% -2.37% 
 Notes: Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) in the full sample of observations partitioned on the employee’s position in the 
clinic month distribution of TotalPay. Columns (1-4) present the results of estimating Equation (2) in the above median pay sample, while 
Columns (5-8) present the results for the group below the median. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix A. All continuous variables 
are Winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. All variables of interest are mean-centered. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 4 Regressions of Performance on Incentive Intensity Measures and Dispersion 
Related to Performance/Dispersion Unrelated to Performance 
 
Panel A: Pooled Cross-Section with additional demographic controls 
 Full Sample dv=Productiont 
  PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 3.783*** 1.256*** 65.605*** 75.918*** 
 (11.06) (9.93) (7.83) (7.65) 
DEPlag 26.372*** 27.592*** 32.595*** 38.116*** 
 (4.51) (3.77) (7.17) (6.23) 
DUPlag -7.020** -5.518 -13.644*** -15.232*** 
 (-1.97) (-0.93) (-4.01) (-3.07) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*DEPlag 16.282*** 23.011*** 464.314*** 581.502*** 
 (4.73) (4.67) (6.95) (6.36) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*DUPlag -9.512*** -14.808*** -306.200*** -227.469*** 
 (-3.61) (-2.85) (-4.92) (-2.73) 
Sizelag -0.265 -0.294 -0.268 -0.270 
 (-1.37) (-1.53) (-1.45) (-1.46) 
ExperienceinFieldt 0.015 0.016 -0.069 -0.077 
 (0.26) (0.27) (-1.25) (-1.31) 
ExperiencewithFirmt 0.410*** 0.411*** 0.449*** 0.453*** 
 (3.10) (3.06) (3.51) (3.43) 
Female -3.777*** -3.557*** -3.610*** -3.530*** 
 (-3.30) (-3.06) (-3.27) (-3.08) 
African American -5.866 -6.423 -4.399 -4.761 
 (-1.24) (-1.37) (-0.96) (-1.03) 
Asian 1.538 1.866 2.489 2.726 
 (0.40) (0.54) (0.66) (0.76) 
Caucasian 2.163 2.233 3.232 3.612 
 (0.64) (0.73) (0.95) (1.14) 
Hispanic 3.801 4.284 5.134 6.679 
 (0.82) (0.99) (1.14) (1.54) 
Other 1.930 1.327 3.057 2.946 
 (0.44) (0.33) (0.73) (0.72) 
Constant 37.494*** 34.590*** 38.910*** 37.374*** 
 (8.37) (7.96) (9.21) (9.01) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 11,304 10,080 11,304 10,080 
Adj. R2 26.60% 28.90% 31.00% 33.10% 
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Panel B: Person fixed effects specification 
 
 dv=Productiont 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 1.278*** 1.256*** 64.363*** 81.186*** 
 (13.45) (10.72) (37.34) (35.25) 
DEPlag 10.228*** 10.991*** 11.469*** 13.412*** 
 (10.17) (8.21) (13.63) (11.94) 
DUPlag -4.426*** -5.682*** -7.100*** -9.413*** 
 (-4.18) (-3.44) (-7.69) (-6.86) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*DEPlag 6.841*** 8.561*** 191.482*** 286.121*** 
 (8.27) (8.04) (15.89) (17.10) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*DUPlag -3.743*** -4.544*** -165.114*** -117.729*** 
 (-3.54) (-2.76) (-11.65) (-5.34) 
Sizelag -0.366*** -0.468*** -0.346*** -0.464*** 
 (-6.07) (-7.46) (-6.02) (-7.71) 
Constant 41.091*** 39.815*** 42.068*** 41.114*** 
 (69.04) (68.45) (76.37) (75.77) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Person Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 27,680 24,048 27,680 24,048 
Adj. R2 3.03% 3.30% 7.76% 8.69% 
 
Notes: Table 4 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) in the full sample of observations replacing the single 
overall dispersion measure with dispersion related to performance (DEP) and dispersion unrelated to performance 
(DUP). Columns (1) and (2) use PPS as the measure of incentive intensity, while Columns (3) and (4) use PFP as the 
measure of incentive intensity. The even columns use one month windows to measure all variables of interest, while 
the odd columns use a rolling three-month window to measure the variable of interest. Variable descriptions are 
provided in Appendix A. All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. All variables of 
interest are mean-centered. *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 5 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Panel A1: Alternative Measure of Incentive Intensity (CommissionRate & 
PctCommission) (Pooled Cross-Section with additional demographic controls) 
 
    dv=Production   
  Commission_Rate PCTCOMM 
    1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensity 44.020** 13.829*** 14.871*** 
 (2.32) (6.72) (6.20) 
Gini -66.586 17.739*** 25.920*** 
 (-1.33) (2.75) (2.74) 
IncentiveIntensity*Gini 437.568* 42.136** 53.162* 
 (1.76) (2.03) (1.78) 
Size -0.420** -0.373* -0.440** 
 (-1.97) (-1.80) (-2.03) 
ExperienceinField 0.016 -0.063 -0.066 
 (0.26) (-1.10) (-1.09) 
ExperiencewithFirm 0.399*** 0.457*** 0.479*** 
 (2.83) (3.37) (3.41) 
Female -4.419*** -3.965*** -3.905*** 
 (-3.61) (-3.39) (-3.20) 
African American -1.783 -3.282 -3.880 
 (-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.77) 
Asian 5.686 3.053 3.384 
 (1.18) (0.71) (0.81) 
Caucasian 6.141 4.097 4.483 
 (1.35) (1.05) (1.18) 
Hispanic 6.269 5.603 7.352 
 (1.06) (1.08) (1.42) 
Other 7.109 4.135 4.240 
 (1.36) (0.85) (0.88) 
Constant 20.217*** 31.983*** 34.548*** 
 (2.97) (6.78) (7.27) 
    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 11,647 12,053 10,657 
Adj. R2 23.40% 25.60% 27.50% 
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Panel A2: Alternative Measure of Incentive Intensity (PctCommission) (Person fixed 
effects specification) 
 
 
 dv=Productiont 
  PctCommission 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 16.568*** 19.094*** 
 (42.96) (38.40) 
Ginilag 5.819*** 9.427*** 
 (5.06) (5.83) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*Ginilag 18.718*** 35.711*** 
 (4.96) (6.68) 
Sizelag -0.336*** -0.441*** 
 (-5.84) (-7.25) 
Constant 35.187*** 39.244*** 
 (66.07) (68.63) 
   
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Person Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 27,680 24,048 
Adj. R2 7.64% 7.52% 
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Panel B1: Alternative Measure of Overall Pay Dispersion (COV) (Pooled Cross-Section with 
additional demographic controls) 
 
 Full Sample Fixed Effects       dv=Productiont 
  PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 3.684*** 4.469*** 66.345*** 74.025*** 
 (10.68) (9.43) (7.48) (6.98) 
COVlag 8.683*** 11.091** 8.837*** 12.105*** 
 (2.63) (2.41) (3.08) (2.91) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*COVlag 3.488* 5.670** 144.182*** 171.067*** 
 (1.81) (2.02) (3.35) (2.72) 
Sizelag -0.251 -0.292 -0.316 -0.356* 
 (-1.23) (-1.40) (-1.58) (-1.73) 
ExperienceinFieldt 0.030 0.031 -0.066 -0.074 
 (0.52) (0.51) (-1.15) (-1.23) 
ExperiencewithFirmt 0.408*** 0.418*** 0.444*** 0.472*** 
 (2.98) (2.99) (3.31) (3.40) 
Female -4.174*** -3.995*** -4.005*** -3.958*** 
 (-3.50) (-3.29) (-3.43) (-3.25) 
African American -5.306 -6.054 -3.472 -4.178 
 (-1.09) (-1.24) (-0.69) (-0.83) 
Asian 2.280 2.617 3.044 3.253 
 (0.56) (0.67) (0.72) (0.79) 
Caucasian 3.004 3.126 4.109 4.484 
 (0.81) (0.89) (1.06) (1.19) 
Hispanic 4.684 5.468 5.836 7.727 
 (0.90) (1.07) (1.14) (1.50) 
Other 2.985 2.695 4.144 4.226 
 (0.63) (0.59) (0.86) (0.89) 
Constant 34.655*** 32.034*** 32.133*** 34.738*** 
 (7.10) (6.63) (6.89) (7.37) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 11,304 10,080 11,304 10,080 
Adj. R2 23.60% 25.70% 26.00% 28.10% 
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Panel B2: Alternative Measure of Overall Pay Dispersion (COV) (Person fixed effects 
specification) 
 
 
 dv=Productiont 
  PPS PFP 
 IV Window= 1-Month 3-Month 1-Month 3-Month 
IncentiveIntensitylag 1.265*** 1.278*** 66.574*** 85.799*** 
 (13.27) (10.88) (39.01) (38.01) 
COVlag 2.315*** 3.011*** 2.988*** 4.385*** 
 (3.73) (3.40) (5.81) (6.10) 
IncentiveIntensitylag*COVlag 1.958*** 3.372*** 59.705*** 97.592*** 
 (3.58) (4.49) (7.26) (8.40) 
Sizelag -0.372*** -0.479*** -0.347*** -0.467*** 
 (-6.16) (-7.62) (-6.05) (-7.74) 
Constant 40.834*** 39.789*** 35.162*** 39.545*** 
 (68.43) (68.23) (65.80) (69.26) 
     
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Person Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 27,680 24,048 27,680 24,048 
Adj. R2 2.13% 2.54% 6.72% 7.57% 
 
 
Notes: Table 5 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) in the full sample of observations using alternative measures of 
incentive intensity (Panel A), alternative measures of overall pay dispersion (Panel B. Variable descriptions are provided in 
Appendix A. All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. All variables of interest are mean-centered. *, 
**, *** indicates statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
